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ABSTRACT. In this paper, we examine the on-the-ground realities of upstream-downstream negotiations and transactions over
ecosystem services. We explore the engagement, negotiation, implementation, and postimplementation phases of a “reciprocal water
access” (RWA) agreement between village communities and municipal water users at Palampur, Himachal Pradesh, India. We aim to
highlight how external actors drove the payments for ecosystem services agenda through a series of facilitation and research engagements,
which were pivotal to the RWA’s adoption, and how the agreement fared once external agents withdrew. In the postimplementation
period, the RWA agreement continues to be upheld by upstream communities amidst evolving, competing land-use changes and claims.
The introduction of cash payments for environmental services for forest-water relationships has given rise to multifaceted difficulties
for the upstream hamlets, which has impeded the functionality of their forest management committee. Upstream communities’ formal
rights and abilities to control and manage their resources are dynamic and need strengthening and assurance; these developments result
in fluctuating transaction and opportunity costs not originally envisaged by the RWA agreement. The paper demonstrates the importance
of an explicit understanding of the local politics of negotiation and implementation to determine the effectiveness of compensation-
based mechanisms for the supply of ecosystem services.
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INTRODUCTION
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are instruments to
recognize, protect, and manage the benefits humans derive from
natural ecosystems and to maintain or enhance these flows (Engel
et al. 2008, McElwee 2012). PES rewards individuals or
communities whose land-use decisions have a positive impact on
the supply of sought and well-defined services through a
voluntary and conditional transaction between supplier and
buyer (Wunder 2005). Such 'ideal-type' PES schemes encourage
a particular focus on measurement, monitoring, and the
conditionality of payments, and schemes with these elements have
been proposed or adopted for the delivery of water and carbon
sequestration (Porras et al. 2008, Wunder et al. 2008, Farley et al.
2013). However, incentivizing particular land-use and land-
management strategies may give rise to new types of trade-offs
because altering socio-environmental interactions directly affects
local resource users, potentially exacerbating the vulnerability of
some members of the community (Kerr et al. 2007, Goldman-
Benner et al. 2012, Vira et al. 2012). Designing and implementing
PES schemes that avoid these trade-offs and deliver both
environmental protection and poverty alleviation requires a
thorough and grounded understanding of local resource users
and their aspirations and needs (Kerr 2002, Pagiola et al. 2005,
Daw et al. 2011).  
Watershed protection has a distinct up- and downstream
geography whereby upstream activities such as herding or logging
are assumed to affect the quality and quantity of water available
further downstream (Calder 2005, Martinez et al. 2013). These
geophysical relationships mirror and replicate, at the local scale,
the previously popular “theory” of Himalayan environmental
degradation, where upland cultivators and land users were
blamed for lowland sedimentation, flooding, or water shortages
(see Forsyth 1996, Guthman 1997, Blaikie and Muldavin 2004).
This builds on much earlier discourses and beliefs about the
potential links between land management practices in the
Himalayas, and their consequential impacts on soil and water
management regimes in the plains, dating back to the early
colonial period. Saberwal (1999) for instance documents the
changing rationale for restrictions on grazing in the Kullu and
Kangra forest settlements in Himachal Pradesh, and their
justification as measures for hydrological control and to address
soil erosion. There are a number of examples of what would now
be called an “ecosystem service” rationale being adopted for
watershed management in different parts of the Indian
subcontinent since the early 19th century (Vira et al. 2012).  
As subsequent work has shown, the protection of entire
watersheds requires interventions in complex social-ecological
systems, with users of different socioeconomic means and
extensive land practices that result in highly variable costs and
opportunities across stakeholders. These give rise to difficult-to-
manage or predict “intangible” outcomes (Kerr 2007, Kosoy et
al. 2007). The dynamics of landscape and forest management and
their variable impacts on geo-hydrological processes (Bruijnzeel
2004), as well as the complex interactions within communities and
between upstream and downstream actors (Kerr et al. 2014),
require adaptive watershed management strategies that respond
to changing knowledge and local political developments (Bonell
and Bruijnzeel 2005). India has (at least from the 1970s) trialed
and implemented a number of compensation schemes that
recognize these upstream-downstream relationships in the
context of watershed protection through World Bank-, NGO-,
government-, and user-led incentive strategies (Kerr 2002, 2007,
Kerr et al. 2007). Key insights from these projects include the
importance of the conditionality of payments made contingent
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on community performance, legal support, and clarity of
property rights (Kerr et al. 2007).  
In parallel, India has undertaken decades of decentralization for
the formalization of existing community management of
resources, particularly over forests (Agrawal 2001, Nayak and
Berkes 2008). PES instruments are now receiving increased focus
in the forest context, particularly in light of the 73rd constitutional
amendment assigning devolved powers and functions to local
government levels (Kerr 2002, Vira et al. 2012). This paper
outlines one of the first PES-like agreements negotiated at
Palampur town in the state of Himachal Pradesh. The state
government has been in the vanguard of India’s provinces in
adopting the ecosystem services paradigm, and adopted an
official “Policy on Payments for Ecosystem Services” in 2013,
wherein precedence was to be given to community-managed
resources in the negotiation of new agreements (Government of
Himachal Pradesh 2013).  
We contribute insights into the divergences between PES policy
(and theory) ideals and on-the-ground practices. We focus on the
socio-political relations, land-use practices, and institutional
changes required from an upstream community for the continued
operation of a contractual PES agreement for the protection of
a microwatershed. In our empirical context, upstream
communities are managers of a forest from which a small town
in the lower Himalaya derives some of its drinking water source.
We investigate the development and implementation of a PES-
like agreement in a mountainous environment wherein the
availability of alternative water sources is more limited.
Heterogeneities and differences between community members in
relation to livelihoods, interests, personal connections and
preferences, aspirations, and levels of trust result in ongoing
challenges to collaboration and collective action, despite user-
financed programs being typically better targeted and often
tailored to local conditions (Asquith et al. 2008, Wunder et al.
2008, Wunder 2013, Kerr et al. 2014). PES contracts risk ignoring
or oversimplifying complex local political economy and as a result
could precipitate new conflicts, especially when monetary or other
forms of compensation result in differential outcomes within the
community (Kerr et al. 2014), thereby undermining future
collective action.  
It is recognized in the literature that the negotiations to establish
PES-like schemes are political (Hope et al. 2007), but there is little
detailed exploration of those politics (Corbera et al. 2009). An
uncritical embrace of PES that neglects how politics, culture, and
economy govern implementation could reinforce existing power
structures, inequalities, and vulnerabilities (Corbera et al. 2007a,
b, Pascual et al. 2014). Design of PES for watershed services
requires negotiation with multiple stakeholders—providers,
beneficiaries and intermediaries—who often have varied,
sometimes conflicting, positions (Hope et al. 2007). Evidence
from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Nepal suggests that
negotiations over PES schemes to develop a shared understanding
of the diverse interests, assets, capacities, and power of players
can take significant time, as does the building of trust between
stakeholders (Dietz et al. 2003, Meinzen-Dick 2007, van
Noordwijk et al. 2008). Experience with decentralized forest
management demonstrates that the political influence of winners
and losers from such negotiation processes have a long-term effect
on the design, implementation, and impact of interventions
(Ribot 2009, Poteete and Ribot 2011). As environmental,
socioeconomic, and political contexts change over time, the
signals created by incentive-based mechanisms can also change
(Jack et al. 2008). Schemes developed through external project
and institutional support require a thorough appreciation of local
contextual nuances and relations, and appreciation of the
capacities, and (usually short-term) commitments of
intermediary organizations.  
In the case of Palampur, imbalanced power relations exist between
the urbanizing, wealthier town with its formal governance
institutions capable of raising revenue as well as representing the
towns’ needs, and the upstream communities, who have a rural
council, called the Panchayat, but no equivalent singular
representative body with a role in overseeing forest or water
management. Intra-community conflicts and divergent interests
further undermine efforts for building collective institutions,
which have been seen to be of central importance for the long-
term adoption and support of conservation-oriented PES
agreements, particularly in environments with weak formal
institutions (Clements et al. 2010). The task of organizing
stakeholders, agreeing to acceptable contractual terms,
instigating monitoring and compliance activities all constitute a
significant long-term and ongoing challenge. In this paper, we
also problematize our own roles as external intermediaries,
instigators, and researchers of the PES-like intervention that we
have described here. Most PES schemes do not develop
spontaneously between service users and providers, and external
facilitators have interests and obligations that are tied to achieving
project objectives that may be distinct from community interests
(de Groot and Hermans 2009, Wunder 2013). Indeed, although
communication and trust are bases for collective action, and as
outlined above require time, externally instigated PES
interventions may neglect to prioritize the nurturing of long-term
community institutions. In the present case, new upstream
community institutions for forest were formed (and older ones
disrupted) to contract with Palampur town for the provision of
water services within the PES agreement, leading to complex
political dynamics within the villages.  
We trace the development and life of a user-financed and
externally facilitated reciprocal water access (RWA) agreement
(Wunder et al. 2008, Martinez et al. 2013) between downstream
water users in the small town of Palampur in the Himalayan
foothills, and communities in three upstream hamlets. We focus
on the complexities encountered within the upstream community
and the effects of maintaining an ongoing ecosystem services
payment scheme.
METHODS
We draw on research and engagement in the town of Palampur
and upstream villages from 2004 to 2014, a period punctuated by
the adoption of the RWA in 2010. One of the authors (CA) was
involved in the original surveys and the development of the
Palampur Water Governance Initiative (PWGI) between
2009-2010. From 2011, the implementation and impacts of the
RWA were studied as part of a research project on the political
economy of negotiations around environmental management
interventions in India, funded by the UK’s Ecosystem Services
for Poverty Alleviation (ESPA) program, involving other authors
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(CK, CA, WA, RH, BV). A follow-up research project on
understanding water security and livelihoods in the Himalayas
provided the rest of the authors with opportunities to continue
to monitor and study the evolving political dynamics at the site
(EKK, BV, CA).  
We draw on a range of data. First, a household questionnaire was
undertaken with 62% (n = 37) of upstream village households
(total household n = 60) in three settlements surrounding Bohal
spring (Fig. 1) to understand the demographic profile of the
hamlets and explore households’ use of forests. Our sampling
strategy was nonrandom, as a full census of the three villages was
attempted but not achieved because of the limited availability of
respondents. Second, a series of five open village meetings were
held during 2011 and 2012, attended by a total of 33 people, who
had also completed the household questionnaire, during 2011.
Third, in-depth interviews were conducted with representatives
of local organizations facilitating the Palampur Water
Governance Initiative (2010-2012, 2014). Although sampling in
2011-2012 could not cover all households in the upstream villages,
the questionnaire, open meetings, and interviews provided
complementary insights into the relationships within and between
villagers and their use and access of the local forest. We have also
observed and recorded local land-management practices and
forest use as an outcome of our decade-long engagement at
Palampur, such that we are confident that the sampled villagers
are representative of the diversity of forest access patterns and
needs in the upstream catchments.  
We adopted an interpretive and grounded approach to data
analysis. The qualitative insights from village meetings and
interviews helped to unpack the interests and motivations of the
main stakeholders associated with the RWA scheme, and to
generate an interpretation of secondary data sources, such as
project reports and planning documents. The survey data was
used to supplement these interpretations and to provide greater
depth of understanding and explanation.
OVERVIEW OF THE RECIPROCAL WATER ACCESS
AGREEMENT
Palampur is located in the Kangra district of Himachal Pradesh
in the western Himalayas in India at the foothills of the
Dhauladhar mountain range (Fig. 1). The estimated population
of the Palampur Planning Area, which includes Palampur, is
46,224. The town receives an average rainfall of 2500 mm per year,
of which over 80% falls during the three months of the summer
monsoon (Kaul et al. 1993). Hydrologically, the high ranges of
Dhauladhar above the town are of critical importance because
winter showers and melt from snow and ice from these ranges
ensure year-round flows to the Neugal River, which supplies most
of the water to the town.  
Palampur town obtains water from four sources: a canal (a kuhl,[1])
and pipeline from the Neugal River; a small stream (Bagha nala
[2]); a spring in Bohal village; and a few electric and hand pumps
that extract groundwater in different locations of the town. The
Irrigation and Public Health Department (IPH) manage bulk
water supply and treatment from the Neugal River via canals and
pipelines, while the Municipal Council (MC) of Palampur
manages the Bohal spring and pipelines. The MC manages the
distribution of all water including the spring supply to and within
the town. The MC purchased the land surrounding the Bohal
Spring source around 1952. Bohal spring water is not mixed with
water from other sources, but supplied to the town center area.
Its relative importance has been declining to Palampur town in
volumetric terms, because it formed the majority of the supply in
the 1980s, while today it accounts for only about 15% of the
drinking water network (C. Agarwal 2010, unpublished
manuscript; interview, 2014). The promise of clean water and its
regular supply to central areas of the town remain politically
important issues during local council elections and influence the
perceived importance of the MC as an institution within
Palampur, especially as the MC holds the bulk payments to the
IPH to be too high (interview, 2014).
Fig. 1. Map of Palampur town and surrounds, including Bohal
Spring and the location of three settlements to the northeast of
the town.
FOREST MANAGEMENT AND INSTITUTIONS AT
BOHAL
The upstream settlements Bohal, Mandai, and Odi, the service
providers of water to Palampur, comprise a total of 60 households
(Odi is biggest with 27; Mandai smallest with 10 households). The
villagers are mainly of the pastoral Gaddi community who now
also practice settled agriculture. The forest under which the spring
recharge zone is located was originally village common land, used
by the community for fodder, leaves, firewood, and timber. The
Himachal Pradesh Forest Department regulates use of forest land
in Himachal Pradesh. The forest area used by villagers, locally
called Bheerni Forest, is officially classified as “undemarcated
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protected forest.” Rights of local use were codified in 1895, which
gave the villagers of Bohal, Mandai, and Odi rights to collect
forest produce for their own use. The forest subsequently became
degraded, and the Forestry Department undertook Social
Forestry Projects (C. Agarwal 2010, unpublished manuscript).  
Because men often migrate either for work or to be with cattle,
women primarily undertake collection of forest products, and
have historically managed forests. The household survey revealed
that use and dependence of forest products was high among
villagers. The most important forest product was firewood (65%
of respondents). Annual firewood consumption was about 3700
kg per family (10 kg/household/day). Leaf fodder was the second
most important resource, each family collecting an average of
1100 kg annually. Community forest protection had begun in
1999, and 89% of respondents said that firewood availability had
increased since that time, and expected that continued protection
would maintain fuelwood supply. The most important indirect
benefit of the forest was reported to be its role in retaining water
and hence offering protection from flash floods.  
Local narratives suggest that the extensive oak and rhododendron
forests started degrading from overexploitation over the past few
decades. In 1999, the women from Bohal and Mandai village who
had formed a Mahila Mandal[3] (a village women’s group) decided
to regulate extraction of forest products and to protect the forest.
The forest protection was in response to two key factors. First,
deforestation was believed to exacerbate the effects of flash floods,
which caused massive damage to crops and houses in Bohal in
1997. Second, the village women wanted to stop the people from
neighboring Jhanjara village from using the forest (because their
use had increased with closure of the forest adjoining their own
village because of a plantation project implemented by the Forest
Department). Subsequently, women from Odi village also formed
a Mahila Mandal, and the groups decided to hire a forest guard
(Rakha[4]) to protect the forest. The Rakha was paid in both cash
and in kind, e.g., in grain. As one woman explained,  
When we started protecting the forest, women from Odi
also showed interest ... they suggested to keep a Rakha
to protect the forest as Mahila Mandal members cannot
protect the forest on their own. We all realized that we
should keep one and everyone started contributing ten
rupees [per month] for keeping the Rakha. 
(participant-2, Village Meeting-1, 2011) 
Although the Mahila Mandal protected the forest, they did so
without formal recognition or support from the Forest
Department or any other government agency. They also fully
closed the forest because no harvesting of fuelwood or fodder was
allowed, on the logic that the degraded forest needed time to
recover. Forest condition improved gradually, but there were
renewed pressures for local use from both within and outside the
village. Because the Rakha was not recognized by the Forest
Department, it was difficult to enforce restrictions and impose
penalties on violators. For example, one respondent observed
that, “there were a few families who did not contribute but often
went to the forests” (participant-3, Village Meeting-1, 2011).
Further, there were frequent conflicts between the members and
the guard. One respondent observed that, “the guard allowed
certain families to collect products from areas where the forest
was in good condition and restricted others” (participant-4,
Village Meeting-1, 2011). Occasionally, there were disagreements
between members about collection and expenditure of funds,
which also related to underlying issues of management
transparency. There were also instances of outsiders questioning
the authority of the Rakha to stop them from using the forest,
which in turn challenged the basis of protection by the Mahila
Mandal. Thus, when the RWA scheme was proposed, there was a
perceived need among villagers to improve the system of forest
protection and to give it formal recognition. Equally, indications
of latent conflict within the village community were already visible
at this inception stage of the RWA, particularly in relation to the
pre-existing institutions for forest management, the role of the
Rakha, and perceptions of selectivity in the application of rules
to different families and forest users.
INITIAL NEGOTIATION PROCESS: DESIGNING THE
RECIPROCAL WATER ACCESS AGREEMENT
The Water Governance Initiative
The Palampur Water Governance Initiative (PWGI) arose from
a collaborative project between the German Development Agency
GIZ and the state Government of Himachal Pradesh, under the
project “Capacity building of Panchayati Raj Institutions in
Himachal Pradesh” (2007-2011). This aimed to better enable the
legal and institutional decentralization of environmental
management, particularly of water. Previous work had been
undertaken in 2004 by the International Institute for Environment
and Development (UK) and Winrock International India, who
led an action-learning project in Himachal Pradesh “Fair deals
for watershed services in India,” exploring the potential for
incentive-based mechanisms (Agarwal et al. 2007). Palampur
emerged as a promising site for a PES-like scheme, with strong
local institutions, functioning community arrangements for forest
protection, as well as interest from both up- and downstream
stakeholders (Agarwal et al. 2007).  
Members from the earlier project allied with a local organization
based in Palampur, the Himachal Pradesh Eco-Development
Society, and with support from the GIZ, started the Palampur
Water Governance Initiative (PWGI; see Fig. 2) to increase
interaction and trust between different stakeholders and to
identify and implement measures to improve water quality and
enhance water quantity. The PWGI facilitation team undertook
a feasibility study in 2009 to explore the needs of upstream
villagers and the downstream town, and to identify potential for
a PES-like scheme to improve water management. The
downstream perspective was captured through a roundtable
meeting attended by the Municipal Council, the Irrigation and
Public Health Department and the Forest Department (see Fig.
2).  
The 2009 study identified two problems: first, the effects of
increasingly erratic patterns of water supply, attributed partly to
reductions in local rainfall and snowfall, on discharge from
springs and streams, especially in the nonmonsoon dry summer
months (C. Agarwal, S. Prasanna, and Himachal Pradesh Eco-
Development Society 2009, unpublished manuscript); second,
long-standing water quality issues during the monsoon period as
a result of high silt loads in the Neugal River caused by increases
in sediment and debris associated with construction of an
upstream hydropower project. These changes increased the cost
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of water treatment and extended the annual shut down for storage
tank maintenance, such that (even today) the MC remains in an
ongoing dispute with the Irrigation and Public Health
Department over the rate of water fees charged to the town from
the river. In this context, the Bohal Spring offered an alternative
source of relatively clean water for which the MC did not have to
negotiate with or pay the Irrigation Department.
Fig. 2. Stakeholders involved in the Palampur Water
Governance Initiative (PWGI).
Negotiation of the RWA required “intense effort[s]” by the
facilitation team (C. Agarwal 2010, unpublished manuscript). The
personal expertise and interests of facilitation and staff  in
establishing a functional incentive-based mechanism, the
willingness of stakeholders, and the positive upstream-
downstream relations at Palampur all lent themselves to the
establishment of the agreement, which was signed by the
Palampur MC and the Bohal-Odi Village Forest Development
Society in October 2010. It required the protection of forests led
by the Mahila Mandals to transition to a new Village Forest
Development Society to manage the Bohal forest, and continue
to control forest product harvesting in order to protect the
catchment of the Bohal spring. The Palampur MC, as the direct
beneficiary of the water recharge services, committed to pay a
sum of INR 10,000 (~US$160) per year.
Negotiations with downstream actors
The majority of the members of the executive committee of
Palampur MC contacted by the facilitation team in 2009 were
interested in securing the long-term source sustainability of the
water supply from Bohal spring. However, they were not sure
which part of the upstream forest comprised the infiltration zone
of the spring, and whether its protection would actually improve
discharge. The MC insisted on a scientific assessment before
backing the idea of a PES-like intervention with public funds, as
previously they had obtained spring water from Bohal for free.
Accordingly, a rapid geohydrological study was carried out by an
independent consultant hydrologist. They identified a zone within
the forest near Bohal with high potential for infiltration and
groundwater recharge (manuscript). A presentation of this
assessment to the MC and submission of the report was found to
be sufficient by the then-President and other executive members
of the MC, as well as the facilitation team. As the ex-President of
the MC said,  
Within the MC some members raised the question that
we had already bought the water many years ago so why
should we pay for it now? We convinced them that this
was a good effort and then when the hydrologist gave the
report they were ready to do anything. (interview, 2011) 
The hydrologist’s report convinced the MC that a small payment
for forest management would be a worthwhile investment,
particularly in light of the difficulties upstream communities had
experienced in the past in limiting forest access. The consultant
recommended continuous monitoring of the Bohal Spring
discharge and discussions with upstream villagers about
institutional mechanisms for forest protection. The MC needed
to be convinced that there were institutions in the village that had
the authority and capacity to control forest access and use, and
that would implement the proposed RWA agreement.
Negotiations with upstream actors
In 2009, the three villages were divided over future forest
management. Some people wanted to continue protection while
others wished to restart logging, although all parties were
concerned about the long-term viability of forest resources. The
facilitation team introduced the idea of a registered village forest
protection group to manage the forest and implement a long-term
management plan, and a PES-like RWA scheme to reflect the
assumed relationship between forest state and water supply. The
hope was that the new upstream village forest protection group,
which had members from all three (Bohal-Odi-Mandai) villages
near the Bohal spring, would continue the protection of the forests
and implement the rules and bylaws to manage the forest, to both
meet the needs of the village communities and provide the basis
for an agreement with the Palampur MC.  
In 2009-2010, the PWGI team held detailed discussions with
various members of the Mahila Mandal about the Bohal spring
head and the forests. There were conflicts between members of
the Mahila Mandal and the Rakha, challenges in enforcing
protection within the community, and formal legitimacy
requirements from the perspective of the Forest Department.
These problems, and the administrative requirement to take up
the delegated protection responsibilities under the state level
regulations for Participatory Forest Management, with the ability
to exclude outsiders, led the facilitating team and the Forest
Department to decide that a new Village Forest Development
Society (VFDS) should be formed to protect the forests, rather
than using the existing Mahila Mandal. The VFDS could be
legally recognized by the Forest Department, be authorized to
manage and protect the forests, and receive grants for forest
management. At the same time, the VFDS, with a locally elected
executive committee and a local member secretary, would answer
to its membership rather than to the Forest Department.
Members of the VFDS comprised all households of the villages
that required fuelwood or access to the forest. Each member of
the VFDS was required to pay an annual fee of INR 100 (US$1.60
at 2015 exchange rates) to pay a Rakha for forest protection. The
VFDS Executive Committee was given powers to impose a fine
for any violation of rules. The prospect of the VFDS as an
autonomous, formally recognized institution with powers to
enforce protection also encouraged women to take part in
discussions on negotiation for the RWA because of women’ active
history of leading in forest management. However, these decisions
were promoted and fulfilled as a result of the facilitation efforts
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of the external PWGI team (and to the timeframes of the GIZ-
supported project), and did not emerge “organically” as an
outcome of local political dynamics and timeframes (c.f.
Clements et al. 2010).  
In 2010, the Bohal VFDS was registered as a village organization
following the Himachal Pradesh Participatory Forest
Management rules of 2001. An ad hoc VFDS executive committee
of 10 members was nominated by villagers (four from Odi, three
from Mandai, and three from Bohal), and elected in a joint
meeting of the three villages. There were two important features
of this process. First, women were in a majority at the meeting,
because of the gendered nature of forest responsibility for
fuelwood collection and management, and the men who had been
nominated opted out, resulting in a women-only committee (GIZ
2011). Second, control of forest management passed from the
Mahila Mandal to the new VFDS executive committee, under a
new president. Previous Mahila Mandal office bearers were
excluded from holding positions in the new committee because
of their still extant role in management of the Mahila Mandal,
and it was felt that the same individuals should not lead both
groups. However, a consequence of this was that the VFDS
became headed by younger women with less experience, and
rendered the role of the older Mahila Mandal in forest protection
and as a management institution somewhat obsolete. Both these
processes had subsequent impacts on the internal political
dynamics within the upstream villagers, and levels of internal
cohesion and trust, which are critical to the longer term
sustainability of the RWA agreement.  
The facilitation team simultaneously discussed a 20-year plan to
manage the forest (and thereby, in theory, protect the Bohal spring
recharge zone) with the residents of all the three hamlets including
the VFDS committee members. This was done separately in the
three hamlets, to identify differences and preferences over
practical forest management. There was common agreement
among villages about the need to protect the forest, and to start
some level of controlled harvesting after years of no harvesting;
however, there were differences regarding the level of harvesting
and the nature of restrictions on forest use. Consensus was arrived
by accommodating one or the other demand of each hamlet, for
example by adopting Bohal’s suggestion of 15 days for leaf fodder
collection but Mandai’s suggestion of seven days of grass
collection. It was also decided that the forest would be divided
into three zones for controlled rotational harvesting, so that each
block of the forest got two years’ rest and recovery before a
harvest. The facilitation team held a final meeting to review and
finalize the agreement and subsequently prepared draft bylaws
based on an available template of bylaws for Himachal Pradesh
Participatory Forest Management rules, which included
provisions for PES agreements. The bylaws were discussed and
finalized in consultation with all the stakeholders. There was no
significant involvement of Palampur Municipal Council in the
formulation of bylaws and rules for forest management or the
Management Plan; the downstream stakeholders were not
actively concerned about the needed land-use changes and
requirements to be undertaken by the upstream.
Payment levels and conditionality
Once the VFDS was established, and the forest management plan
agreed, the facilitation team drafted the Reciprocal Water Access
agreement, based on the inputs from the VFDS Executive
Committee, village consultations, and the Palampur Municipal
Council. The Council was reluctant to pay for forest protection
by villagers because revenue from water supply in Palampur was
insufficient to meet operational and maintenance costs. Further,
there was very little information (or information considered
reliable) either on the value of water to Palampur consumers from
the Bohal spring, or the opportunity costs of not deforesting the
area around the spring. After several rounds of discussions
between the MC and VFDS, facilitated by the project team, a
payment of INR 10,000 (US$160) per year with a 10% increase
after every five years was agreed. Furthermore, if  the forest was
not adequately protected, then the MC reserved the right to issue
a notice to make amends, and terminate the agreement if  amends
were not made.  
To receive the payment, the VFDS had to protect and manage the
forest area in accordance with the forest management plan and
RWA prepared by the facilitation team. Monitoring was kept
simple. The VFDS agreed to invite the MC for a joint “walk” to
the spring recharge zone twice a year, once in spring or summer
and once after the monsoon, to make a visual assessment of the
condition of forests. They would then jointly sign a report on
forest condition and the VFDS would raise an invoice for
payment. Any concerns were to be addressed in the following year
and the payment for the next year would be based on the
evaluation of the agreed measures.
OUTCOMES, INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND
CONFLICT
The RWA agreement has remained in place since 2010. From the
perspective of the downstream Municipal Council, it has been a
relative success. As of June 2014, the MC had not received a single
complaint about the quality or quantity of water to houses in the
town for at least six months, and there was a general perception
among officials interviewed that the quantity of the water
discharge had increased from the spring source, though this is
empirically unverifiable. The MC has elected to forgo any formal
monitoring checks of the forest area; local contacts and
interactions have been sufficient to assure the MC that the forest
is being maintained. As mentioned by office bearers of the MC,
they can see the forest from the MC office and it looks green and
healthy even from afar.  
In contrast, in the four years following implementation, the
situation at the three villages has evolved less smoothly in relation
to the forest protection institution. Although a formal guard was
not in place for most of 2013-2014, most upstream villagers
interviewed in 2014 felt that the forests were being protected by
the community, and there was indeed no visible large-scale
damage or felling. However, the earlier focus group discussions
in 2011 had already revealed increasing disagreement between
various groups within and between the villages about the
extraction of products such as leaf fodder from forests required
by the RWA; some villagers thought that more leaf fodder could
be sustainably extracted; the lopping would also reduce fire
hazards. The continuation of restrictions on grazing under the
RWA also led to conflicts over traditional rights of grazing in the
forest area because some families in the village still keep large
herds of 400-500 sheep and goats. When the VFDS imposed a
fine on one family for letting some goats graze freely, one villager
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let the herd into the forest when he was moving downhill during
the winter. A number of people frequently sent their cattle to the
forest for grazing and did not pay the fine if  imposed by the VFDS
in the post-2010 period (personal observations, 2011-2012). Such
disregard for the rules was attributed to the wider disagreements
between the Rakha and the VFDS committee and the persistent
questions around the destination of payments from villagers to
the Rakha, with money in the VFDS fund from its members, as
well as Palampur MC’s annual RWA payment.  
In addition to the annual revenue from the MC under the RWA,
the VFDS also collected a monthly fee from its members (initially
Rs 10/mth, then Rs 20), which was to go to the Rakha. However
there have been accounting gaps that have given rise to
misunderstandings that have undermined the functionality of the
VFDS and the authority of the Secretary. In addition, a conflict
with a hydropower firm over construction of electric line pylons
in the forest went to the local court and led to further stress on
key members of the VFDS, and regular executive committee
meetings or general body meetings of the VFDS were
discontinued for almost a year. Thus, in 2014, no member of the
VFDS interviewed knew precisely if  previous years’ payments had
been made. On the one hand, this suggests that the payment is
relatively insignificant to either the VFDS or the hamlet
communities, and that forest protection is ongoing out of a
genuine recognition by villagers of the need to protect their
resources. However, the gaps in the revenue from the local monthly
contributions has also exacerbated community tensions around
financial management, safeguarding, and transparency and
accountability.  
Focus groups and in-depth interviews in 2014 revealed different
interests in and concerns about the RWA agreement. There was
discontent among some old members of the Mahila Mandal who
were not included in the VFDS executive committee. During the
negotiation and the initial postagreement phase, the new VFDS
executive members were invited to meetings by the facilitation
agencies and interacted regularly with MC officials, forest
officials, and research and NGO groups. This new-found status
of executive committee members may have reduced cooperation
with other executive members of the pre-existing Mahila Mandal. 
For instance, during one of the meetings, a Mahila Mandal 
member said,  
We have more conflicts since the creation of VFDS and
it is increasingly difficult to stop people from using the
forests... it might perhaps help to divide the forest into
three parts and form a separate VFDS, rather than a
combined one. (Village Meeting-1, 2011) 
Some members also complained about the payment of INR 100
as the membership fee to VFDS in addition to the to the INR 20
fee to the Mahila Mandal,  
It is an extra burden to pay INR 100 and also protect the
forest... Sometimes we cannot pay the money, we are poor
people. (Villager-1, Village Meeting-2, 2011) 
During 2012 a hydropower company built electricity lines through
the community’s forests, which led to an extended court case.
VFDS members were accused of extortion and had to legally
defend themselves and challenge this development. This case led
to an initial consolidation within the village, with key male
residents and members of the earlier Mahila Mandal taking on
an active supporting role in the defense of the accused VFDS
members during the Court proceedings, with support from an
environmental activist active in the area. However, the case
stretched to almost a year with numerous hearings. After the case
was settled in late 2013, the VFDS received a monetary transfer
of INR 100,000 as settlement. Part of this money was distributed
to the five individuals who had been targeted in the case and had
invested both time and/or money in representing themselves and
the community in court, divided so that each received INR 5000.
Lawyers’ fees amounted to INR 16,500, and the remaining funds
were left in the VFDS bank account (verified by authors CA and
EKK). However, in the wider community there was a perception
that the sharing of funds was done unilaterally without
community concurrence and lacked transparency. Many believed
that the entire sum had “disappeared” or had been
misappropriated. As a result of the fallout from this case, the
President of the VFDS felt that she had “had enough” and even
suggested that she wished to pass the post on to others (interview,
May 2014).  
The dominance of women on the VFDS committee was also
referred to increasingly as a point of conflict in interviews
conducted with villagers after 2012. For example, there was an
informal group of young men in the village (a youth club) that
had no formal link with forest protection. After completion of
the RWA agreement, they became vocal and critical of the
agreement, saying “women have sold the forest ... why should we
pay and protect the forest?” (member of Mahila Mandal,
participant-1, Village Meeting-1). During focus group
discussions, one young man said “it is fine that a VFDS is formed
but in the next election we will not give powers to the women; the
committee will be of men only” (male youth club member, Village
Meeting-2). Many villagers said that they were not aware of the
bylaws and the actual content of the RWA agreement, except that
the village would receive money. One young man said, “As in 1952,
our forefathers were illiterate and our water was bought by the
MC from them due to their ignorance and now the same thing is
happening...” (male youth club member, Village Meeting-5).
Another villager contributed, “We did not pay much attention to
the meetings as we thought it was for women only ... we did not
have the knowledge of why and how the VFDS was formed”
(Villager, Village Meeting-5, 2012). These disputes and rumours
undermined the legitimacy of the VFDS and its ability to function
for a time. As one VFDS member summarized, “People say that
we have sold our forests and not that we are trying to stop them
from using it the way they have been in the past” (VFDS member,
Village Meeting-1, 2011).  
The gaps in facilitation support led to no engagement with the
village over 2013-2014, beyond some informal engagement. This
absence and narrow communication channels with only some
members of the village population, and in particular with the
elected members of the VFDS by the researchers may, to some
extent, have contributed to the heightened conflict and feelings
of exclusion by community members. Information flows can be
highly problematic within villages, where word of mouth and
developed social relations and their accompanying alliances and
prejudices easily lead to misunderstandings. As recounted above,
at Bohal the RWA agreement led several villagers to hold the
impression that the forest area had been “sold” to the Palampur
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Municipality, and many claimed not to know where the received
annual payment was destined. These developments meant that
the VFDS committee was close to dysfunctional for part of 2013
and 2014, however both the upstream community and
downstream MC agreed that the forest was by and large protected
and the VFDS was eligible to receive payments from the Palampur
MC.
DISCUSSION
Since the signing of the RWA agreement in 2010, developments
in Palampur town and its surrounds have included the growing
presence and pressure of hydropower interests and new
infrastructure.[5] The lives, opportunities, and thus decision-
making frames of villagers in the hamlets have also changed. As
a result, the RWA must be understood as one element of an ever-
changing socio-political landscape where land claims and uses
continue to evolve and exert changing pressures on existing
practices and agreements. In this context, the negotiated and
agreed opportunity cost of the RWA agreement becomes just one
element of a much more complex and dynamic social reality. It is
important to understand the social networks and linkages that
reinforce the need for embedded social negotiation of PES-like
contracts, as was done here, rather than the introduction of
standardized templates developed elsewhere (Kolinjivadi et al.
2014). Agreements must take into account historical costs and
duties for the management of the same resource, or risk creating
new conflicts that lead to resistance and dissent.  
We have presented evidence that demonstrates how disparate the
stakes of up- and downstream communities are in the
management of a small watershed. Although buyers must be
convinced of the importance of the water-forest service to be
willing to buy, sellers in the upstream areas must not only modify
extant land-use practices, but be willing to accept leadership and
authority from both within and outside the community to manage
their resource, often with competing objectives. Based on our
experience at Palampur, although the agreement included basic
conditionality and monitoring elements in the design and
maintenance of a PES-like scheme, satisfying conditionality in
practice and verifying impacts of payments were of little interest
to either upstream or downstream actors (evidenced by the
cessation of monitoring activity on the withdrawal of research
and project attention at Palampur in 2012). A rapid technical
hydrological assessment proved to be sufficient evidence for both
research teams and local communities to begin implementation
of the RWA. Similarly, local autonomous interest in forest
protection is a demonstrably powerful motivator for continued
forest protection because although the upstream community kept
a local forest guard to protect the forest, protection continued
even when the guard was not in place. This raises interesting
questions about the necessity of financial incentives for
maintaining the protection of upstream watersheds, as opposed
to the role of monetary transfers to initially catalyze such
agreements, where there may be little motivation for, or evidence
of, pre-existing protection activity.  
The implementation of PES in Palampur was the result of a
complex negotiation process. The initial GIZ-supported
facilitation process successfully negotiated the agreement between
Palampur MC and the upstream hamlets, and enabled the
formation of a new upstream institution, the VFDS, to take over
the forest protection responsibility from the women’s group
(Mahila Mandal) and contract with the MC. However, at the end
of the project timeline the facilitation team withdrew, leaving the
upstream community without advisory, institutional, or practical
support to help the newly formed VFDS and wider community
maintain and enforce the forestry practices required.
Subsequently, two ESPA-supported research projects have led to
some informal facilitation and support of the VFDS by field staff
during the course of the research, but intermittently, as this is not
the main focus of these projects. At village meetings two years
after the signing of the contract, field staff  had to remind villagers
that their role was “only to facilitate the agreement and capacity
building as mandated by the [original] project” (field notes, 2012).
Furthermore, negotiation capacities of local communities need
development and support, because at Palampur some of the
cobenefits discussed at the negotiation phase of the contract
promising sanitation and education have not occurred, because
of responsibility falling entirely on the newly created and
overstretched VFDS group to realize these additional potential
benefits. When local cultural and social acceptance drives the
success of PES contracts (Kolinjivadi et al. 2015), the importance
of social cobenefits may be high, which are in keeping with the
ambitions of PES to both enhance particular ecosystem services
and to alleviate poverty and improve well-being (Corbera et al.
2007a,b, Gauvin et al. 2010, Fisher et al. 2013). Our experiences
in Palampur demonstrate the importance of providing long-term
advice and support to newly contracting parties to enable the
realization of management goals as well as capacity-building that
is likely to enhance communities’ abilities to respond to
developments, such as the expansion of hydropower interests in
the present case.  
Two further elements emerged from the negotiations and
postagreement implementation and political engagements. First,
the experience of the facilitation process with the sellers in
Palampur suggests the need for a better understanding of local
politics and greater effort in consensus-building in organizing
upstream stakeholders. Here, the rapid creation of an all-women
VFDS became problematic with time and a source of mistrust
within the hamlet communities as a result of a lack of
transparency with the disbursement of funds from the
hydropower settlement, and a lack of clarity among villagers
about where the yearly MC payments were going. PES projects
in these contexts can benefit from building more participatory
(consensus) mechanisms for enforcement and decision making
that grasp local dynamics and complexities. The task of
facilitation in such cases is to better understand these processes,
and identify and support community mechanisms for
transparency and conflict prevention and resolution.  
Second, the fact that the payment was small and had a relatively
small impact on the income of both providers and buyers has a
number of implications. As buyer, the MC’s main interest in
securing the protection of the catchment of the Bohal spring to
provide part of the town’s water supply was influenced and formed
by competing concerns, on the one hand to continue to meet the
supply needs during critical monsoon months and to perhaps
demonstrate its ownership of the spring source, and on the other,
the politics of the local elections. The way the amount of payment
was determined challenges the economic foundation of PES
design principles. For the villagers, the direct benefits of
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controlled harvesting of forest products, continued community
forest management and control, and the indirect assumed benefit
of protection from flash floods were the main incentives for
protection, and the payment provided an additional financial
benefit. Because they were already protecting the forests, the
initial additional cost was low. However, the introduction of a
high(er) membership fee to the management committee placed
extra burdens on the villagers, who had decided to save the
payment under the RWA in their bank account, rather than use
it for protection or distribution. Further, those who participated
in the VFDS were already committed to forest protection, while
others who also affect forests, like graziers, were not well
represented, such that the focus of negotiations and the agreement
ignored other important relationships and users, and how they
may need to be accommodated or compensated. Thus at the
community level, payments do not address the concerns (and
costs) of those stakeholders who bear higher impacts than others.
This imposed limitations on the RWA agreement as a conditional
and negotiated instrument to secure watershed services in
Palampur.  
The case of protecting forests and critical water zones in Palampur
demonstrates the need for an explicit understanding of how to
empower communities so that they can realize effective resource
management through deliberative intra-community consultation
and representation. The incentive and governance arrangements
that prevail both in the upper catchment and in small towns are
critical to determine the potential for compensation-based
schemes for the supply of ecosystem services more generally, and
especially in the perceived importance of these schemes from the
vantage of upstream sellers. As similar arrangements evolve and
proliferate, there is considerable merit in understanding the long-
term political economy dynamics in local transacting
communities, which influence the outcomes and sustainability of
such interventions.  
__________  
[1] Kuhl, a small, local, gravity-fed canal drawn from river/stream;
it may be earthen or lined, and managed locally or by the IPH.
[2] Nala, the local term for a stream or small river; may be seasonal
or perennial and often used interchangeably with the term khad.
[3] In Himachal Pradesh, since mid-1990s a number of self-
initiated Mahila Mandals (village women’s groups), Yuva
Mandals (youth groups), and self-help groups were formed in
villages to promote environmental conservation, income
generation, and other village development activities.
[4] The practice of keeping a Rakha is common in many villages
in the Kangra and Palampur districts that have Co-operative
Forest Societies, duly recognized by the Forest Department. The
main role of Rakha was to enforce rules such as no tree-cutting
without the permission of the Forest Department, no grazing in
closed areas, and to allow only dry firewood collection. However,
the Rakha in this village initially did not have this formal status.
[5] These developments in hydropower expansion have had
significant social and economic effects on the settlements around
Palampur, but have not affected the Bohal Spring catchment.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
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